Take the battleground state of Illinois as an example. In last November's election, Gore swept the state by 570,000 votes, but won only 11 of the state's 20 districts. Gore carried the three blackmajority districts anchored in Chicago (the 1st, 2nd and 7th) by margins ranging from 145,000 to 170,000 votes -a Gore advantage of 480,000 votes in those three districts alone. Meanwhile, Bush failed to carry any district in Illinois by more than 40,000 votes, but won nine of them.. The pattern in Illinois was similar in 1960, even though the outcome was much closer: Kennedy's narrow 8,858-vote edge was enough to bring him the state's 27 electoral votes and the presidency. But Nixon would have won Illinois under the district plan, as he carried five more congressional districts than Kennedy.
Yet the district plan would not have produced gains for the Republicans in every close election. In 1968, when Nixon defeated Democrat Hubert Humphrey by barely a half million votes, there would have been a small movement of electoral votes to third-party candidate George C. Wallace using the district plan. The former Alabama governor would have taken 11 electoral votes from Nixon and one from Humphrey.
That is why the district-by-district tally from this election could be so interesting. It is not a leadpipe cinch that Bush would have been the winner under this electoral system. Rather, like so many other aspects of the 2000 election, it may provide another instance of "What if…"
Note: When available, a compilation of the 2000 presidential vote by congressional district will be published in this newsletter.)

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:
If the Voting Was by Districts F or years, the two major alternatives to the present statewide winner-take-all system of electoral voting have been a direct popular vote for president and the district plan, which would give a candidate two electoral votes for winning a state and one electoral vote for each congressional district carried. This system is already being used in two states, Maine and Nebraska, though it has yet to produce a split result.
Employing the district plan would have reversed the outcome of the 1960 election, and thrown the 1976 election into doubt. Of the other presidential contests since 1960, the district plan would have made the losers' electoral vote tally a bit more respectable, but would not have changed the election outcome.
Ronald Reagan's 525-to-13 rout of Walter F. Mondale in 1984, for example, would have been reduced to 469-to-69.
Nixon's 520-to-17 drubbing of George McGovern in 1972 would have become 476-to-62.
And in 1996, Bill Clinton's 379-to-159 defeat of Bob Dole would have been reduced to 345-to-193. Altogether, the shift in electoral votes using the district plan rather than the current system would have ranged from a low of 12 (to third-party candidate George C. Wallace in 1968) to a high of 92 (from Reagan to Jimmy Carter in 1980). Adding together the electoral votes from 1960 through 1996, the Democrats would have gained a few dozen by using the district plan. But that is because they were drubbed so badly in most of the presidential elections of the 1970s and 1980s. In a close election, the district plan has been more apt to favor the Republican candidate. That was the case in 1960 and 1976, although the three-way race in 1968 bucked that trend to a degree.
District totals from the presidential elections of 1960 through 1996 were compiled using data from Congressional Quarterly, primarily issues of the Weekly Report for earlier years and Politics in America for the later years.
Noted in bold type are those instances where the current system and the district plan would have produced different outcomes. The actual electoral vote includes "faithless electors," which are listed in the "Others" column. Most cities contain in large numbers the minority groups, particularly African Americans, that are the most loyal element of the Democratic Party. But in many instances, Gore carried urban centers by larger margins than his former boss, Bill Clinton, did in his decisive re-election victory in 1996.
Gore won both Baltimore, Md., and Multnomah County (Portland), Ore., by roughly 15,000 more votes than Clinton did four years earlier; Philadelphia and King County (Seattle), Wash., by about 20,000 more votes; Chicago by nearly 50,000 more votes; and both Los Angeles County and New York City by over 100,000 more votes than Clinton won them in 1996.
Altogether, Gore swept these eight urban centers by a combined margin of nearly 4 million votes over George W. Bush and won all eight states that they are in. As it turned out, Gore needed every urban vote he could get. Without his huge margin of victory in Philadelphia, he would not have carried Pennsylvania. Without Detroit, he would not have won Michigan. Without Chicago, he would not have taken Illinois. Without Multnomah County (Portland), he would not have pulled out Oregon. And without King County (Seattle), he would not have won the state of Washington. That is 81 electoral votes right there of the 266 that Gore received.
In the adjoining chart, Gore's margin of victory in these cities (or urban-dominated counties in the case of the Pacific Coast states) is compared to his statewide margin of victory, and in the final column is put in percentage terms. In New York, for instance, more than three-quarters (or 77%, to be precise) of Gore's statewide margin came from New York City. Nearly two-thirds of his margin of victory in California was rolled up in Los Angeles County. And where the percentage is above 100, Gore's citywide margin exceeded his statewide margin. The vote totals are based on official returns from last November's election. Losing Ground at the Start R epublicans begin the presidency of George W. Bush in an anomalous position. They control both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue for the first time since the mid-1950s. Yet Bush is one of only five presidents since the Civil War to enter office with his party having lost seats in both the House and the Senate -and Republican margins in Congress are tenuous.
Gore Victory Margins
The Republicans also lost ground on both sides of Capitol Hill when Bush's father was elected in 1988, although then the Republicans were already a minority in both chambers. And John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960 with reduced, but still substantial, Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate.
Presidents that come into office with their party losing ground on Capitol Hill do not tend to see that trend reversed in their first midterm election two years later. Rather, in the four previous cases, the president's party has continued to lose ground in the House, although when Democrats Kennedy and Grover Cleveland were in office, their party did pick up seats in the Senate. Meanwhile, the lopsided nature of the Democratic opposition to Ashcroft muted a bit the regional distinctions. Still, the Republican "L," non-L, disparity was evident. Ashcroft got most of his "yea" votes -five of the eight -from the smaller cadre of Democratic senators within the "L," including both members from North Dakota, Kent Conrad and Byron L. Dorgan. 
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